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Response to Professor Wax
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine,
New Bottle
MICHAEL SELMI
Professor Wax has written a provocative article that asks an interesting and
important question: If much of what is defined as discrimination is unconscious,
how do .we go about remedying it? This is a question that has largely been neglected
in the burgeoning literature on the unconscious nature of discrimination, but
Professor Wax's answer turns out to be far less interesting than the question she
asks. Professor Wax seems to be arguing that given the difficulty of eradicating
unconscious discrimination, it would be best to leave the discrimination
unremedied, as a way of freeing employers from what she considers to be the
onerous and inefficient constraints of antidiscrimination law. She believes we
should leave the discrimination unremedied even though she admits unconscious
discrimination is exceptionally difficult to prove, and, according to her, only
occasionally infects the employment process. The costs, are nevertheless, too high
for employers to bear, and at one point, she even suggests that we look at the
viqtims of discrimination as the "cheapest cost avoiders,"' an argument that elevates
blaming the victim to a whole new level. Ultimately, after raising a serious and
important question, Professor Wax retreats into a well-worn law and economics
discussion that is principally concerned with the costs employers face to eradicate
workplace discrimination, a discussion that is sure to garner few converts.
In this brief response, I hope to expose the flaws in Professor Wax's argument
and will do so primarily by demonstrating that her argument is based on a
misunderstanding of the nature of unconscious discrimination. Professor Wax seems
to think that labeling discrimination as unconscious means it is beyond the control
of the actor, subject perhaps to retrieval only at the hands of a trained analyst, a
claim that is neither substantiated in the article nor endemic to the concept of
unconscious discrimination. Once that proposition drops out of the analysis, the rest
of her argument goes as well. I will also spend some time discussing the limits of
her economic analysis, although it is also important to highlight up-front that her
economic analysis is fully dependent on the notion that unconscious discrimination
is uncontrollable, a proposition that seems fundamentally at odds with the
neoclassical model she wants to follow. That said, I will seek to reveal the
assumptions and biases that drive Wax's economic analysis; in a nutshell, her
argument ultimately amounts to little more than an obsessive concern with the
potential costs that eradicating unconscious discrimination has on employers
without any concurrent concern for the costs that discrimination imposes on victims
and society.
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am grateful to
Eun-gyoung Shin for her research assistance and to Leslie Lee for her tireless library assistance.
1.Amy L. Wax, Discrimination asAccident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129,1206 (1999).
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This response may seem unduly critical, and that will be so for two reasons. First,
I will not spend any time discussing the areas where I may agree with Professor
Wax, thus giving the appearance of greater disagreement than there may actually
be. But more to the point, the idea that we should largely ignore unconscious, which
can also be described as subtle, discrimination questions the very purpose of our
antidiscrimination laws. Since 1973, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
Title VII prohibits discrimination that is subtle in nature, which the Court has also
noted on many occasions characterizes most workplace discrimination.2 Therefore,
concluding that eradicating unconscious discrimination is not worth the cost that it
imposes on employers is tantamount to largely shutting down our antidiscrimination
apparatus-although it would be doing so not because workplace discrimination
had been eliminated, not even Professor Wax is willing to make that claim. Rather,
it would be because the cost of preventing such discrimination was somehow too
burdensome for employers, an issue most conservative scholars have been
unwilling to advance previously Indeed, outside of the limited context of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and cases involving religious discrimination,
employers have generally not been allowed to assert a cost defense to claims of
employment discrimination.4 Taken to its logical extreme, Professor Wax's
argument would actually advance the issue one step further by largely precluding
claims based on unconscious discrimination: no defense would even be necessary.
This is a strikingly dangerous idea, one that runs counter to everything we know
about proving claims of discrimination.
As should be apparent, I am treating Wax's article as advocating that we prohibit
liability for claims based on unconscious discrimination despite her rather heroic
retreat at the end of her article where she concludes that we should leave our
existing liability system intact. I will not speculate on why she may favor this
conclusion but will note it is wholly inconsistent with her preceding hundred or so
pages, all of which are orientated toward concluding that it is unwise, and surely
inefficient, to hold employers liable for unconscious discrimination.5 Thus I will
2. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting that "women still face
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination"); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (stating that "Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise").
3. The notable exception is Richard A. Epstein in his book FoRBIDDEN GRouNDs: Tun CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DiSCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994) (defining undue hardship); Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (limiting employers' duty to accommodate religious beliefs to
accommodations that do not impose more than a de minimis cost on employers). As one example
of the irrelevance of costs, the Supreme Court has prohibited the use of forms of statistical
discrimination even where the discrimination is accurate. See City of LA Dep't of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-17 (1978) (prohibiting differential pension plans for men and
women). Occasionally, issues of cost do arise in the context of disparate impact and age
discrimination cases, particularly in the latter scenario when an employer seeks to save money by
laying offthe higher salaried employees. However, it is never a defense to argue that discrimination
was cost-effective.
5. Well, I am willing to speculate a little. One reason Wax may refuse to carry her analysis to
its full implications and advocate prohibiting liability for unconscious discrimination, is that such
a proposal would surely fail on its own terms--even if one wanted to reduce employer costs, her
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emphasize her analysis rather than her conclusion, although I do not believe my
critique will stand or fall on whether one accepts that Wax is proposing to do away
with liability for unconscious discrimination.
I. THE NATURE OF UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION
One reason it is somewhat difficult to evaluate her argument is that Professor
Wax never adequately defines what she means by unconscious discrimination. In
some ways, the term might be self-defining-it is discrimination that is not
conscious, that the decisionmaker is not aware of. The problem with that definition
is that it is difficult to know whether the decisionmaker was, in fact, aware of the
discriminatory nature of his actions. Let me give an example. Suppose a hiring
manager routinely rejects female candidates, voting against them ninety-five percent
of the time while supporting male candidates approximately fifty percent of the
time. What if the manager says that he was unaware of this pattern, that he never
kept track of gender, and also had reasons for why he rejected a number of the
candidates? What if it turns out that some of those reasons were factually incorrect,
or that the manager was treating two identically qualified individuals differently and
the only apparent difference was their gender? How is this example to be
categorized-does it represent unconscious discrimination or would we treat it as
pretextual, assuming instead that he must have been aware of the discriminatory
pattern?
So long as the manager says that he was not aware of the pattern, it is conceivable
that under Professor Wax's schema for treating unconscious discrimination
differently, no liability would attach regardless of the evidence one might introduce,
with the possible exception of some statement the manager may have affirmatively
made regarding his awareness that his conduct was intentionally discriminatory. It
may be that Professor Wax would allow circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the
manager's intent, but if that is the case, it is difficult to see how her system would
differ from the current proof structure, other than to introduce a new
element-conscious awareness-into an already complicated and burdensome proof
structure. 6
proposal would be as likely to increase than decrease costs. The reason is that by effectively
prohibiting claims based on unconscious discrimination, her proposal would simply create a system
of litigation regarding whether the discrimination in question was unconscious or conscious in
nature. As noted, currently very few cases involve discussions of unconscious discrimination, but
under her system employers would clearly have an incentive to argue that the discrimination in
question was unconscious in nature and therefore not remediable under Title VIL Plaintiffs,
somewhat bizarrely but no less true, would then be required to argue that the discrimination was
not really unconscious but had some conscious components. It might even be possible to create a
system of mixed-mixed-motives analysis, where the employer could argue that it had some
nondiscriminatory motives for its decision and that much of its discriminatory motive was
unconscious in nature. The absurdity should be plain, and without clear definitions of unconscious
discrimination, it is unlikely that any such proposal would actually result in a reduction of costs at
all, and may very well increase litigation costs.
6. Although it is only tangentially related to her argument, Wax provides a confused and
ultimately incorrect discussion of the proof structures that have been developed for employment
discrimination claims. Wax, like other commentators before her, contends that the McDonnell
1999] 1235
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This definitional issue is a common problem in the literature on unconscious
discrimination where it often appears that such discrimination arises any time the
claim is not accompanied by direct evidence of discrimination, such as derogatory
statements made about someone's competence based on their race or sex.' Of
course, such direct evidence is rare these days and this kind of definition would
sweep most claims of discrimination into the unconscious discrimination category.
Since Wax's concept would undoubtedly make discrimination claims more difficult
to prove, a broad definition of unconscious discrimination would likely substantially
impact the incentives to file discrimination claims, thus having a significant effect
on efforts to reduce discrimination. Without a working definition of unconscious
discrimination, it is simply not possible to know what kind of claims would be
subject to Professor Wax's analysis or even why it is an issue at all.
Douglas pretext structure "presupposes that the actor's reasons are transparent to him: he can and
does in fact know through introspection what his reasons really are." Wax, supra note 1, at 1147
(emphasis in original). As I have argued elsewhere, this is simply a misreading of the structure. See
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Realty ofSupreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEo. L.J. 279, 286-94 (1997). All the McDonnell Douglas proof structure requires is that the
employer articulate the reason for its decision-the person was lazy or not as good as another
candidate-notthe motive for that decision (I thought he was lazy because. . ."). The motive, or
the "why" behind the "what," will naturally be part of the case, but it is the plaintiff's burden to
prove that the reason underlying the decision was discrimination, conscious or otherwise. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
7. It is also possible, though Professor Wax does not seem to fall into this category, that
unconscious discrimination becomes all encompassing in the most circular of fashions so that all
of our actions are not just unconscious but discriminatory as well. For example, in a recent article
Professor Linda Krieger provides a self-analysis to the comments that an African-American student
made in her class, comments that she defined as "halting and somewhat confused." Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirm ative Action, 86
CAL. L.REv. 1251,1287-88 (1998). Professor Krieger concludes that her evaluation of the student
was likely influenced by her own unconscious stereotypes because "my nonprejudiced beliefs did
not displace the stereotypes." Id. at 1287. But what if the student's comments were just halting
and confused; is that not possible? In Krieger's schema, apparently not-one who believes the
judgment was not influenced by stereotypes is simply unaware of the operations of her
unconscious, a means of analysis that ultimately devolves into a game of "gotcha." That said, I
agree with Professor Krieger's ultimate conclusion that "the poor performance of a distinctive
minority student is more likely to be remembered," than that of a white student, id. at 1288; what
I disagree with is the notion that all evaluations are somehow tinged with the forces of unconscious
discrimination.
8. Late in her article, Wax makes the rather odd statement that "unconscious discrimination,
by its nature, must be proved statistically." Wax, supra note 1, at 1214. Here she may be equating
unconscious discrimination with disparate impact theory, in which case her definition would be
a narrow one given that disparate impact cases consume a very small portion of existing litigation.
By the same measure, her purported focus on performance appraisals, which are often subjective
in nature, is wholly inconsistent with her analogy to statistical proof. Although it is theoretically
possible to establish a disparate impact claim based on subjective employment practices, such cases
are both difficult and rare. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)
(permitting a disparate impact challenge to subjective employment practices). While it is not
essential to her discussion, it may be worth pointing out that the example she uses regarding
disparate impact standards-where minority employees have a promotion rate that is 90% that of
nonminorities-falls below the standard set by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1236 [Vol. 74:1233
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The difficulty that arises from determining when behavior can be defined as
unconscious in nature is one reason why I now prefer to use the term "subtle
discrimination" to define discrimination that relies on circumstantial evidence for
proof' Another reason is that bringing the unconscious into the debate obscures the
meaning of intent as used in antidiscrimination law. As I have argued elsewhere,
claims of intentional discrimination do not require proof of animus, motive or an
intent to harm."0 Rather, claims of discrimination require proof of disparate
treatment that resulted from some deliberate action. Accordingly, succeeding on a
claim of employment discrimination requires not that the actor wanted in some
conscious fashion to treat an individual in a discriminatory fashion-to exclude
women from employment, for example-but rather it requires proof that the actions
in question evince evidence that we construe as including an intent to discriminate.
Professor Wax's analysis thus rests on legally inaccurate conception of
intent-one that is akin to motive or animus-and it is through this idea that she is
able to conclude that unconscious discrimination should be treated differently than
discrimination that involves conscious elements. On top of this crabbed definition
of intent, Professor Wax adds an unusually restrictive concept of unconscious
discrimination. Central to her argument is the notion that unconscious
discrimination is uncontrollable, not only by the actor but presumably by anyone,
("EEOC') for establishing a disparate impact claim and certainly could not meet the statistical test
required for proving a claim. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607A (1998) (establishing a rule of thumb showing evidence of adverse impact where
promotion rates for minorities fall below 80% of the rate of nonminorities).
9. Subtle discrimination is not necessarily the same as unconscious discrimination, as
conscious discrimination can be directed in subtle ways. See ELizABETH YOuNG-BRuEBL, THE
ANATOMY oFPREJuDICEs 73 (1996). However, to the extent courts have discussed the issue at all,
they tend to interchange the terms or purport to distinguish them without providing any guidance
for determining between the two. See Smith v. Great Am. Restaurants, Inc., 969 F.2d 430,435
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that'Trst-tier age discrimination may be 'subtle and even unconscious'");
Brown v. M&M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a "plaintiffwho proves
only this subtle and unconscious discrimination has not shown willful discrimination [under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")]'); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, 852
F.2d 1061,1064 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Age discrimination is often subtle and 'may simply arise from
an unonscious application ofstereotyped notions of ability.. . .") (quoting Syvock v. Milwaukee
Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original)); Jayasinghe v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing difficulty of proving
discrimination where "the employer is too sophisticated to implicate itself or where the
discrimination is subtle or unconscious"); Wright v. National Archives & Records Sere., 609 F.2d
702, 713 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that adverse impact theory had "been a mighty instrument in
correcting the more subtle and sometimes unconscious forms of discrimination").
10. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 286-94. Professor Wax seems to be aware that her
interpretation of intent is inconsistent with the legal definition as she discusses the causal element
ofintent Wax, supra note 1, at 1138-39. Yet, after stating the proper definition, she moves back
to the view of intent that best supports her argument For a period of time, Wax seems to mix
things up by arguing that unconscious discrimination is at odds with the existing legal regime. Id.
at 1146-48. Yet, she then backtracks from this position, and notes that claims of unconscious bias
are not precluded, all of which suggests a confused approach to the question of intent, one that
does not ultimately advance her argument See id. at 1150-51.
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including the actor's supervisors." Her own examples, however, clearly undermine
her argument. Take her very first example: the case of a supervisor who places
more weight on errors in grammar or spelling in a memo prepared by a Hispanic
clerk than one prepared by an Anglo.' Certainly, this situation is not beyond
control-bringing the situation to the attention of the actor is likely to both remedy
the present situation and to prevent its recurrence. But even if it does not, one might
institute a review process to ensure that such disparate treatment does not recur.
Nothing in this situation seems difficult to control or remedy.
This is true of each of her examples, the case of the supervisor who provides a
less favorable evaluation to a black employee, 3 or the professor who favors the
more attractive student over the less attractive one. 4 After all, to borrow her own
metaphor, the person who speeds "unconsciously" ("I did not know I was going 80
mph") is not told that slowing down is beyond her control, she is told to look at the
speedometer." A supervisor who takes race into account in evaluating his
employees should, likewise, be told to look at the situation more objectively-that
is one of the reasons objective criteria or standards are often used as a means of
reducing subjective bias.'6 One can only find these actions uncontrollable by
focusing on the motive rather than the action, but as noted earlier, disparate
treatment concerns the deliberate actions of the supervisor, such as the poor
evaluations, not the reason why the supervisor did what he did. As such, the
problem with unconscious discrimination arises with the matter of proof rather than
in its remedy.
The case of Ann Hopkins, surely the most famous legal case of stereotyping
which Wax equates with unconscious discrimination, provides another example of
how such discrimination can be controlled. In that case, the evidence regarding Ms.
Hopkins' discriminatory treatment included that she was told to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely," etc., and it seemed apparent that many of her
accomplishments were viewed through a gender lens in that her negative qualities
11. See Wax, supra note 1,at 1131.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1135.
14. See id.
15. It may be worth spending a moment pondering what it means to calf something an
accident In order to best understand what Professor Wax means by discrimination as an accident
we might look to two other contexts in which we use the term accident-that of torts, and our
personal lives where we frequently try to explain and sometimes excuse acts by labeling them
accidents. However, in neither context does an accident mean free of responsibility or liability.
Imagine how torts would be redefined if a defendant was never liable for accidents, or if children
could avoid punishment by simply saying "it was an accident" Employers are also held liable for
workplace accidents through worker compensation schemes. In all of these contexts calling
something an accident does not mean that the act could not have been prevented, only that the
actor in question did not intend a particular result, or would have preferred that the result not have
occurred. Only under Professor Wax's analysis would accident potentially mean liability-free.
Surely, the area of antidiscrimination law is a curious one to create such a regime.
16. As Virginia Valian notes, "The development within the organization of objective criteria
for success will help, for several reasons. Such criteria make the standards ofjudgment explicit
they allow employees to know what is expected for success and allow employers to guard against
the tendency to use irrelevant criteria ..... VoRGInA VALLAN, WHY So SLow? 296 (1998).
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were highlighted while her successes were downplayed. 7 Still, hers was not an easy
case to prove; indeed, five of the thirteen judges who reviewed the case thought the
evidence did not rise to the level of establishing discrimination. However, accepting
that she was the subject of discriminatory treatment, that discrimination did not
seem uncontrollable-reviewing her accomplishments on an objective scale, having
someone review the decision with an eye on whether she might be the victim of
discrimination, and simply informing individuals of the influences stereotypes can
have should lead to some substantial reduction in the level of discrimination.
In her recent book, that Professor Wax cites favorably, Virginia Valian provides
an example of a successful effort by the medical school at Johns Hopkins to remedy
a pattern of disparate treatment against female faculty members. According to
Professor Valian, upon investigation a committee determined that mentors invited
male junior faculty to chair conferences six times more often than they invited
women junior faculty.'" Male junior faculty were also far more aware of the
requirements for promotion than female faculty members. Both of these patterns of
disparate treatment were significantly altered by implementing a few institutional
policies, including broad awareness on the faculty of the pattern that had been
discovered. As a result, while in 1990 there had been only four female associate
professors, by 1995 there were twenty-six, and nearly twice as many female faculty
members reported being advised of the criteria for promotion as had done so
previously. 9 Valian concludes, "The Johns Hopkins program demonstrates that
institutions can, with major efforts, significantly improve the status of their female
employees."" I, and others, have also argued that affirmative action plans can serve
as monitoring devices to control discriminatory impulses, whether those impulses
arise from conscious or unconscious forces.2 To be sure, not every effort will be
successful, but my sense is the prospects of improvement by eradicating subtle
discrimination are greater than the likelihood that the efforts will fail. In any event,
before we give up hope at eliminating subtle discrimination, whether it has an
unconscious source or not, we surely need far greater evidence than Professor Wax
has marshaled.
17. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,235 (1989).
18. VALiAN, supra note 16, at 320. To take an example from my own experience, in
considering a young female lateral candidate, a male colleague commented that "her publication
record was thin?' He seemed to back off his criticism a bit when it was pointed out that she had
published more articles in less time than he had. Whether this form of discrimination is termed
conscious or unconscious-he denied that he was aware of any bias or disparate treatment in his
assessment-again, it is not so difficult to remedy.
19. See id.
20.d The School of Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently embarked
on similar changes to remedy what it now concedes were years of discriminatory treatment toward
female professors. See Kate Zemike, MiT Women Win a Fight Against Bias: In Rare Move,
SchoolAdmits Discrimination, BOsTON GLoB, Mar. 21, 1999, at Al.
21. See BAREARAR BERaANN, INDE oF~szAFIRMATIVEACTION 13-17 (1996); Michael
Selmi, Testingfor Equality: MerH Efficiency, and the Affinnative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 1251,1296-98 (1995).
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On that score, let me say a few words about the evidence Wax collects, but I do
want to restrict myself to a few words since I do not want to become embattled over
proper interpretations of the literature, or devote time to expanding on the literature
in any significant way. Rather, my intent is to highlight some of the limitations of
the works Wax cites. First, her citations are actually quite limited in number,
particularly given the depth of the social psychology literature, and she suggests a
far greater consensus on the nature of unconscious discrimination than actually
appears to exist. For example, within social psychology, there appears to be
substantial disagreement on the prevalence and definition of unconscious
discrimination, and perhaps more important, on the ability to control the use of
stereotypes, a fact Professor Wax occasionally acknowledges through string
citations in footnotes.22 Professor Susan Fiske recently summarized the state of
social psychology research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination as
follows:
Social psychological research, reviewed here in four major sections, explains that
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have (1) some apparently automatic
aspects and (2) some socially pragmatic aspects, both of which tend to sustain
them. But, as research also indicates, change is possible, for (3) stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination seem individually controllable, and consequently,
(4) social structure influences their occurrence.'
Many others have suggested ways in which stereotyping can be controlled or limited
by the actor herself, and as noted earlier, installing review or monitoring devices
can likewise limit the effect of an individual's judgment.2 4 This is also an area
22. Wax, supra note 1, at 1164 n.105 ("As a general matter, research yields an uncertain
answer on whether more or less 'individuating' information about targets make for better or more
accurate judgments.); see also id. at 1140 n24, 1141 n.26, 1142 n.29, 1167 n.115, 1168 n.116.
23. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK ON
SocIAL PSYcHoLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). Fiske concludes her
summary by noting,
The bad news is that people's habitual use of subjectively diagnostic information,
certain information configurations, and perceived ovariation sustains
stereotypes....
The good news is that people can sometimes control even apparently automatic
biases, ifappropriately motivated, given the right kind of information, and in the right
mood. People therefore can make the hard choice.
Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
24. For a sampling of the extensive literature suggesting that stereotyping can be controlled,
see Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 621,627 (1993) C(Our main program of research ... has been showing that social
structure affects attention, and if people pay more attention, at least some of them are less likely
to stereotype."); Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual
Harassment: A Theory with Implications for Organizational Change, J. Soc. IssuEs, Spring
1995, at 97, 110-12 (discussing ways in which organizations can decrease the effect of
stereotyping); Samual L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: Elements of Intergroup
Cooperation, 76 J. OFPERsONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 388,398 (1999) ("Any intergroup activity
that induces the perception of common identity among the groups has the potential to reduce
intergroup bias, with or without the components of intergroup cooperative interaction.'); Steven
L. Neuberg, The Goal ofFonningAccurate Impressions During Social Interactions: Attenuating
the Impact ofNegative Expectancies, 56 J. oF PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 374, 374 (1989)
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where Wax seems to confuse two different concepts. As Patricia Devine has argued,
"[A]lthough one may have knowledge of a stereotype, his or her personal beliefs
may or may not be congruent with the stereotype. Moreover, there is no good
evidence that knowledge of a stereotype of a group implies prejudice toward that
group." In other words, it is one thing to suggest that all people have access to
stereotypes, and quite another to suggest that those stereotypes will automatically
control or determine behavior.
Even if one accepts the findings Wax relies on, the studies themselves tend to
provide only limited support for the notion that stereotypes are either omnipresent
or uncontrollable. This is in large measure due to the nature of the experiments,
which tend to involve small numbers of undergraduate psychology majors, the
results of which have not necessarily been replicated. Now, I do not mean to
demean the nature of social psychology, but rather would urge caution before
accepting the studies she cites as definitive, particularly when Wax wants to use
them in such a strong fashion. Rather than being used to radically alter employment
discrimination law, the studies are far more appropriate at assisting us in
understanding the nature of unconscious discrimination.
Not only does the literature fail to provide the basis for her proposal, but it is also
unclear what need there is to reduce claims based on unconscious discrimination.
Throughout her article, Wax purports to be concerned primarily with the costs of
such discrimination on employers, which would suggest that the litigation involving
claims of unconscious discrimination is unduly expensive. Unduly, in this context,
should mean either that the litigation results in excessive amounts of unfounded
judgments against employers or that the costs of eradicating such discrimination
exceeds the benefits of the effort. Neither claim has been substantiated; indeed, the
evidence suggests exactly the contrary.
Even Professor Wax acknowledges that proving a claim of unconscious
discrimination is exceedingly difficult 26 Indeed, based on the existing data, it would
be a stretch to suggest that discrimination of any kind was somehow too easy to
prove. Only about fifteen percent of the employment claims filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission result in any relief being awarded to the
plaintiff, an extraordinarily low level of success when compared to other kinds of
claims." When Title VII cases were tried to a judge, only prisoner cases fared
(arguing that having a goal of forming accurate impressions reduces the detrimental impact of
negative expectancies); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental
Attribution Error, 48 Soc. PsYcHoL. Q. 227, 233 (1985) (discussing how accountability or
requiring people to justify their decisions can result in "debiasing" under certain circumstances).
25. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 563. PERsONALrrY &Soc. PSYCHOL. 5,5 (1989) (both emphases in original).
26. Wax, supra note 1, at 1150-52. ,
27. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in
EmploymentDiscrimination Law, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 13 (1996). The EEOC's most recent data
indicate that the patterns of recovery continue. In fiscal year 1998, cause findings accounted for
only 4.6% of the merits determinations made by the EEOC, and only 12A% of their resolutions
appeared to result in some relief for the individual who filed a charge. See EEOC Charge and
Resolution Statistics Through Fiscal 1998, DAxrY LAB. REP., Feb. 9,1999, at E-4.
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worse in federal court.2" The situation has likely improved now that cases are tried
to a jury, but a non-scientific review of recent case law suggests that appellate
courts may be reversing jury verdicts at an alarmingly high rate.29 There is simply
no evidence that employment discrimination claims offer a bonanza for plaintiffs
(or their attorneys), or that antidiscrimination law has substantially affected
corporate profits based on unjustified court judgments.
It is also not at all clear what Professor Wax is so riled up about as she also
suggests that unconscious decisionmaking only rarely influences employment
decisions, in which case it is unlikely to be of particular concern to employers,
unless of course, employers are expected to go to great lengths to avoid judgment
in the few cases where unconscious decisionmaking might be established. But as
an adherent of the rational-expectations framework, Professor Wax cannot make
this claim; it would certainly be irrational for an employer to render an exaggerated
response to limited potential liability." Professor Wax might respond that, although
unconscious impulses only occasionally infect the decisionmaking process,
plaintiffs will always raise the issue and thus employers will be forced to litigate the
extent of unconscious bias in every discrimination claim. This argument, however,
carries little force; as noted, unconscious discrimination is difficult, not easy, to
prove. To date, nearly every commentator has argued for a more relaxed standard
of proof rather than the restrictive standard Wax advocates because these cases are
28. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567, 1588 (1989) (documenting similar success rates in
employment and prisoner cases).
29. The most well-known recent example of an appellate reversal is Mungin v. Katten,
Munchin &Zavis, 116 F3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which was recently the subject of a book. See
PAUL M. BARRETT, TnE GooD BLACK (1999). For other examples of recent reversals ofjury
verdicts in a wide variety of contexts, see Tuttle v. Missouri Department ofAgriculture, No. 98-
1686, 1999 US App. LEXIS 5445 (8th Cir. Mar. 26, 1999) (age discrimination); Coggins v.
Government ofDistrict of Columbia, No. 97-2263, 1999 US App. LEXIS 2603 (4th Cir. Feb. 19,
1999) (race discrimination case); Diet ich v. NorthwestAirlines, 168 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 1999)
(age discriminaion);Lockard v. Pizza Hut, 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998) (sexual harassment);
Baltazorv. Morris Holmes, 162 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1998) (race and sex discrimination); Tidwell
v. Carter Products, 135 F3d 1422 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (age discrimination); DeJarnette v. Corning,
Inc., 133 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1998) (pregnancy discrimination); Shankv. Kelly-Springfield Tire
Co., 128 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1997) (age discrimination); Combs v. Meadowcraft Inc. 106 F.3d
1519 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (race discrimination);Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th
Cir. 1997) (retaliation claim); and Blackv. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997)
(sexual harassment). Obviously, I do not intend for this list of cases to demonstrate that courts are
reversing jury verdicts at a rate that is either biased against plaintiffs or that is higher than other
claims. Rather, I only mean to suggest that it is my impression that there is an increasing trend
towards reversing jury verdicts, as evidenced by the list of cases cited above. To say more than that
would require a far more extensive and complicated empirical analysis.
30. It has been well-demonstrated that employers often do make exaggerated responses to the
threat of enormous punitive damages. See Cass R. Sunstein et al.,AssessingPunitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2077 (1998) (noting that
a risk of extremely high awards can produce excessive caution). However, damages under Title
VII and theAmericans With Disabilities Act are capped at $300,000, and the liquidated damages
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act likewise limits the prospect of ruinous
judgments, at least under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (1996); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1996).
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so difficult and require a finder of fact who is willing to draw inferences from
circumstantial evidence." Moreover, there is a veritable absence of litigation over
the unconscious nature of discrimination, an issue that is rarely raised in reported
cases.
32
31. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and
EmploymentDiscruntation Law: A Modest Proposalfor Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46
EMoRYLJ. 1487,1507-18 (1997) (advocating a means of instructing fact finders on the presence
of unconscious discrimination); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race
Conscidousness.and the Requirement ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MIen. L. REv. 953, 991-1017
(1993) (proposing a rule thatwould reconstruct the existing discriminatory intent standard); Linda
Hamilton Kneger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive BiasApproach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunin, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 1161, 1241-44 (1995) (advocating mixed
motives standard); Charles Lawrence, The Ego, the Id., and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317passim (1987) (advocating an impact standard for
constitutional claims as a means of challenging unconscious discrimination); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, NegligentDiscrimination, 141 PA. L.R v. 899, 967-72 (1993) (urging negligence
standard); Selmi, supra note 21, at 1255, 1296-308 (discussing use of affirmative action as a
means to reduce unconscious discrimination).
32. An electronic search of appellate cases for the terms "unconscious w/6 of discrimination"
produced approximately a dozen cases involving employment discrimination, the vast majority of
which involved the standard for proving wilfulness under the age discrimination statute. See
Oxman v. WL.-TV, 12 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[a]ge discrimination may be
subtle and even unconscious'); MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d
1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Brown v. M&M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 1989)
(proof of unconscious discrimination does not rise to the level ofwilfulness under the ADEA);
Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063,1066 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Brooks v. Woodline Motor
Freight, 852 F.2d 1061,1064 (8th Cir. 1988) (describing age discrimination as often subtle and
unconscious); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.
1984) ("Age discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious.'); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 742 F2d 916, 925 (6th Cir. 1984) (Wellford, J., dissenting) (unconscious discrimination does
not rise to a level ofwilfulness under ADEA); Blackwell v. Sun Elee. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176,1184
n.12 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Orzel v. City ofWauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743,757-78 (7th
Cir. 1983) (same); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 156 (7th Cir. 1981)
(same). Outside of the age discrimination context, courts have mentioned "unconscious
discrimination"infrequently and only in passing. See Glass v. Philadelphia Elee. Co., 34 F.3 d 188,
200 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Putting aside the question of whether, as a matter of
law, a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case may prevail based on evidence of 'unconscious'
discrimination, it seems to me that the plaintiff's reliance on this unconventional theory
substantially diminished the probative value of the evidence of harassment .... .'); Thomas v.
California State Dep't of Corrections, No. 91-1587,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20346, at *8-9 (9th
Cir. Aug. 18,1992) ("Wrere we to hold that the unsupported claim that a particular candidate was
a 'superior' interviewee was sufficient without more to require summary judgment for an
employer, we would immunize from effective review all sorts of conscious and unconscious
discrimination.'); Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988) ("'[S]ex
discrimination is the practice, whether conscious or unconscious, of subjecting women to higher
standards of evaluation than are applied to their male counterparts.") (quoting Sweeney v. Board
ofTrustees ofKeene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1979)); Namenwirth v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 769 F.2d 1235,1243 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[Flaculty votes should not
be permitted to camouflage discrimination, even the unconscious discrimination of well-meaning
and established scholars.'); Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir.
1985) ("[I]n view of the difficulty in proving discriminatory intent where the employer is too
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II. THE PURPORTED ECONOMICS OF UNCONSCIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
The last third of Wax's article is devoted to what might loosely be defined as the
economics of unconscious discrimination, and for the most part treads familiar
ground. Rather than working through her analysis in a point-counterpoint way, I
will initially render some general observations and then critique several of her ideas
in more detail. 3 First, it is important to keep in mind that Wax's analysis is
dependent on the view that unconscious discrimination cannot be controlled or
deterred; to the extent it can be, as discussed above, the cost calculus would be
quite different from what she assumes and most of her analysis would be irrelevant
to the question she seeks to address. Second, it may be worth noting that our
antidiscrimination laws have been in place now for at least thirty-five years and if
there were any substance to her argument, we would very likely already have
witnessed the parade of horribles that she forecasts regarding how
antidiscrimination enforcement will hurt those it is intended to help, drive costs up
unreasonably, and lead to a general loss of social welfare. Indeed, one of the
advantages of predicting the past is that there tends to be data to assist in the
prediction. Yet, Wax never mentions or alludes to the vast literature on the effect
that antidiscrimination laws have had on the employment condition of women and
minorities, most of which suggests that the legal apparatus has appreciably
improved the condition of women and minorities, though some of the studies
suggest that social forces may be equally or more responsible.34
sophisticated to implicate itself or where the discrimination is subtle or unconscious, the prima
facie threshold offers the plaintiff an opportunity to prove discriminatory intent indirectly.");
Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that "patently subjective
evaluations could easily mask covert or unconscious race discrimination"); Wright v. National
Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 713 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that disparate impact law
has "been a mighty instrument in correcting the more subtle and sometimes unconscious forms
of discrimination").
33. One point that requires response is her argument that our current system amounts to a form
of strict liability, a claim that ignores much of the law that has developed around the
antidiscrimination statutes. Although it is true that an employer may be held liable for a decision
tinged with unconscious bias, however defined, the employer is presumed to have control over that
decision. For example, an employee cannot be fired without the employer being aware of the firing,
just as an applicant cannot be hired without the employer having knowledge of that decision at
some level This is not to say that some entity or person called the employer is charged with actual
knowledge any more than it is to say that the employer is charged with actual knowledge of a
decision that results in exposure in a products liability suit. Accordingly, her analysis distorts the
meaning of strict liability by suggesting that strict liability flows any time the principal is liable for
the action of its agents.
34. For a recent discussion of the effect of affirmative action on employment, see BARBARA
F. RpsKiN, THE REALmrEs oF AimumrATw ACION IN EMPLOYMENT (1998). For additional
empirical analyses ofthe effect antidiscrimination laws have had, see John J. Donohue I & James
Heckman, Continuing Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the
EconomicStatus ofBlacks,29 J. ECON. LrmRATuRE 1603 (1991), and Jonathan S. Leonard, The
Impact ofAffinative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on BlackEmployment, J.
EcoN.P E., Fall 1990, at 47. For an influential argument regarding the limited ability of the law
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Another critical operative assumption underlies Wax's argument, one that has
long animated critiques of existing laws. When all is said and done, Professor Wax
simply does not see discrimination as much of a problem for the workplace; her
world view is that employers do not discriminate often, and plaintiffs complain
about discrimination at levels that far exceed its occurrence. This view repeatedly
seeps through her analysis-to take but one example, Wax continually highlights
the potential adverse social costs from what she labels diversity programs, 35 failing
to ever balance the costs against the benefits. Later, Wax reveals her hand even
more clearly when she notes that "a liability system targeted at unconscious
disparate treatment cannot operate without a considerable amount of error."36 True
enough, but the error goes in both directions: there is certainly nothing to suggest
that an employer would bear the weight of all errors, and there is not even anything
to suggest that more of the costs of error will fall on employers than employees. She
simply does not acknowledge.the costs of discrimination, and it seems, in large
measure because she simply does not believe that discrimination imposes any
significant degree of costs on society.
When her assumptions are unearthed, it is not difficult to see how Wax comes out
as she does. If one accepts that there is little unconscious discrimination in the
workplace, but that whatever discrimination does exist is practically impossible to
control or deter, then it follows almost naturally that it would be socially wasteful
to engage in what will likely be futile efforts to eradicate discrimination. Each of
these assumptions, however, is contestable and ultimately empirically grounded,
and Wax has failed to establish any of them conclusively.
Not only are her assumptions unfounded but her economic analysis is likewise
misguided. This can be illustrated by Wax's attack on one of the chestnuts of
neoclassical economics to which she otherwise attempts to closely adhere. At one
point, Wax argues, contrary to the neoclassical school, that competitive labor
markets are unlikely to eliminate unconscious discrimination for a variety of
reasons, but primarily because of the control issue.37 Generally such a conclusion
would be treated as identifying a market failure that would support governmental
regulation of some sort, but here Wax is so intent on avoiding imposing any costs
on employers that she moves instead to a discussion of whether we should treat the
victims of discrimination as the cheapest cost avoiders. And it is here where her
flawed analysis is perhaps most easily exposed.
to create the conditions for social change, see GERALD N. RosENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
35. Wax, supra note 1, at 1190 n.173.
36.Id. at 1194.
37.Id. at 1296-98.
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More than anything else, Wax's suggestion that victims might be in the best
position to avoid the costs of discrimination reveals her own biases and interests.
For example, in her Part ll.C.7, Wax comments repeatedly that potential victims of
discrimination can likely reduce their chances of being a victim by improving their
credentials, changing their appearances, or becoming model employees." This kind
of argument suggests that most discrimination is largely deserved or trivial: if
women and minorities would work harder and become more like the dominant
worker, presumably a white male, then they would find that discrimination will
recede. But this argument ignores everything we know about discrimination,
including the very concept of discrimination itself. As Wax well knows,
discrimination befalls strong as well as weaker employees.3 9 More to the point, her
analysis also fails to grapple with the very meaning of disparate treatment. Even if
it were somehow true that African Americans or women could avoid some
discrimination by becoming a model employee, the law clearly states that it would
still be unequal, and thus unlawful, treatment if African Americans or women were
required to perform at a level that exceeds that required of their white male
counterparts as a way of avoiding discrimination. To the extent Wax is arguing that
black employees need only work up to the level of whites, then she is suggesting
that black employees currently perform deficiently and thus deserve the disparate
treatment they receive, a claim for which she provides no evidence whatsoever.
Similarly, to the extent that Wax is contending that women should become more
like men in order to reduce their probability of discrimination, that sounds like a
definition of discrimination rather than a means of avoiding discrimination.
Even more remarkably, Wax's cost-benefit analysis leaves out the costs, as she
never bothers to pause to consider the harm that is caused to the victims of
discrimination other than in reduced productivity or possibly lost income. In fact,
in a breathtaking paragraph, she suggests that discrimination might actually make
the victims work harder to recover their income loss,4" implying that what we really
need is a lot more discrimination to improve employee productivity. If this were not
enough, although she cites some of the extensive literature discussing why
discrimination is likely to lead to reduced investments in human capital by the
victims of that discrimination, including the work of well-known economists, one
of whom has a Nobel prize in his portfolio, her three-page response includes a
solitary citation to support her argument that discrimination may encourage
38. See id at 1200 (emphasizing "background, education, appearance, grooming, demeanor,
manners, speech patters, work habits, personal conduct, and personality type"); id. at 1200 n.205
("A black man with an honors engineering degree from Harvard, for example, might avoid
triggering presumptions that would attach for someone with a degree in sociology from a lesser
known institution.'); id. at 1202 (emphasizing that a person can avoid adverse treatment "by
look[ing] for ways to be a better employee").
39. It can also find its way into the presumably most rational of the rational. See Van W.
Kolpin & Larry D. Singell, Jr., The Gender Composition and Scholarly Performance of
Economics Departments: A Testfor Employment Discrimination, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv.
408 (1996) (documenting the presence of gender discrimination in economics departments).
40. See Wax, supra note 1, at 1207-08.
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productivity."' Wax errs in large part by concentrating on how particular individuals
might respond to discrimination, whereas, social welfare involves the aggregate
response.4 2 Although some individuals may respond to discrimination by working
harder, the literature seems rather conclusive that the aggregate effect is likely to
depress investments in human capital. 3 As such, Wax clearly stretches matters
when she suggests that this is an idea that ought to be taken seriously, or that
treating the victims of discrimination as the cheapest cost avoiders may be the best
we can do in an imperfect market. We are already doing much better under our
existing model.
The reason Wax's analysis rolls so far off-track is she seems to believe that
efficiency is the touchstone of any legal system, and that an efficient
antidiscrimination system is measured solely by its effects on employers. Most
people would contend that our legal system proscribes discrimination because it is
wrong not because it is an inefficient business practice. As noted earlier, there is
nothing to suggest that our laws were designed to prohibit discrimination only to
41. See id. at 1205 n.217. Consider how her argument might play in a financial investment
scenario. Suppose investor A receives a return of 20% on his investment in CompanyX, while
investor B receives only 5% on her same investment According to Wax, this scenario should
produce even greater welfare as investor B saves more money and works harder to increase her
wealth, given that she will have less income than if she received the higher rate. Surely, in a
financial market we would not countenance either her argument or such discriminatory treatment.
42. Id. at 1204-05 ("More likely the true picture is far more mixed, with different people
responding in different ways.").
43. See, ag., Drucilla Comell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intinsic Wrongs
ofNafivism: Economics; Freedom, andLegal Suppression ofSpanish, 84 CoRNLL L. REv. 595,
645 (1999) (discussing the effects of discrimination in suppressing incentives to invest in human
capital); John . Donohue I, EmploymentDiscrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts
ofEquarty,92MlcH.L.REv. 2583,2419 (1994) ("Because of existing discrimination, members
of the relevant groups will invest less in human capital."); Reuben Gronau, Sex-Related Wage
Differentials and Women 'sIntemrpted Labor Careers--the Chicken or the Egg, 6 1 LAB. ECON.
277, 285-86 (1988) (suggesting that women's lower investments in human capital are likely the
result of lower market opportunities); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace:AccommodatingtheDemandsofPregnancy, 94 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 2154, 2168 (1994)
("In a market that contains such discrimination, blacks and women will invest relatively less in
such programs."); Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Starlz, Private Discrimination and Social
Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AMER. ECON. Rav. 340 (1983) (explaining how
statistical discrimination can reduce incentives to invest in human capital); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, Soc. PEL. & POL., Spring 1991, at 22,29 (explaining why
discrimination reduces incentives to invest in human capital); Peter P. Swire, Equality of
Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533, 1537-41 (1995)
(arguing that groups subjetto discrimination will generally invest less in creditworthiness). As far
as I can tell the only other person who has suggested that discrimination may create positive
incentives is Richard Epstein. Richard Epstein, StandingFirm on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN
Dmo L. Rav. 1, 13 n.27 (1994) (suggesting that blacks and women currently invest in human
capital because "ifone expects hostile treatment, then it pays to be a bit better to overcome the poor
reception").
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the extent it was cost-effective to do so,4" yet that seems to be Wax's exclusive
focus, which can be revealed through her discussion of deterrence.
Indeed, Wax curiously eschews a theory that would almost certainly reduce the
costs of detection, while eliminating greater levels of discrimination. The costs of
detecting discrimination could perhaps be most effectively reduced by lowering the
bar on claims of discrimination, rather than raising them as she advocates. One
primary reason it is currently so difficult to identify subtle discrimination is that
people differ over what properly constitutes discrimination, what acts and behavior
should be labeled as discriminatory so as to create liability, and these differences
can produce considerable and expensive litigation. If we were to change the legal
definition so as to make it easier to prove discrimination, it would correspondingly
be cheaper to identify that discrimination as the costs of detection are directly
related to our definition of discrimination, a variant of the old rules versus standards
conundrum. This suggestion, however, presumes that Wax is concerned with the
cost of detecting discrimination rather than the cost of that discrimination as
measured through liability judgments.
Whether we decide to raise or lower the bar of proof might depend, at least in
part, on whether as a society we would prefer to over or underdeter discriminatory
behavior. Assuming a system of perfect deterrence, however measured, is not
feasible, then the answer to the starkly framed question should be obvious: we
should prefer overdeterrence.4 s Absent some substantial costs, there is no apparent
value to discrimination, and our goal should be, and has been stated as, deterring
discrimination to a level of zero.46 Obviously, overdeterrence may have its costs-at
a certain level, employers may become more hesitant to hire members of protected
groups as a means of avoiding liability, or they may impose unduly harsh work rules
or procedures that would result in a less pleasant or demeaning workplace.
Employers may also retain unproductive employees as a way of avoiding litigation
costs at a higher level than they might otherwise do without the fear of litigation.
These costs may be real,47 but so too are the costs of discrimination, and in deciding
where to draw the line, we have to keep in mind the more difficult discrimination
is too prove, the less discrimination we will remedy. It is simply not possible to
craft a perfect system, one in which only the meritorious claims of discrimination
would succeed, and in drawing the line of liability we have to always balance the
various considerations. Currently it appears the tide is clearly toward drawing a line
that favors employers, but that form of line-drawing only makes sense if we want
to protect employers.
44. 1 do not mean to suggest that we should ignore the costs of enforcement, only that they
should not be the sole or determinative factor in the analysis.
45. Professor Wax, in contrast, never even mentions the problem of underdetterence.
46. This is what is generally referred to as complete deterrence, which is frequently contrasted
with optimal deterrence whereby we seek to reduce the targeted behavior, in this instance,
discrimination, to some socially optimal level. For a recent economic discussion ofthese various
deterrence theories, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998).
47. It is worth noting, however, that the damage caps to Title VII protect against excessive
overdetterence.
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Ultimately, the same is true of Professor Wax's argument: it only makes sense if
we want to offer greater protection to employers. Two questions remain
unanswered, however: why would we want to do that? And, more importantly,
where in Title VII, or any of the antidiscrimination laws, do we find a statement
that, whenever feasible, the statute should be construed with a primary concern for
reducing costs on employers? Such a proposition is not in my copy, and when I look
in my normative file, it is not in there either.

